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VALIDITY OF NEW YORK STATE
ETHICS COMMISSION RULE 932.2
BARRING PUBLIC OFFICERS FROM
HOLDING POLITICAL PARTY OFFICE
William Josephson* and Beverly Jean Ross*
INTRODUCTION
In 1954, on the recommendation of Governor Thomas E.
Dewey, the New York State Legislature enacted several statutes
establishing a code of ethical standards to govern the conduct of
public officers. 1 New York Public Officers Law section 73 was
intended to regulate situations in which a conflict of interests
clearly endangers the proper exercise of public service. Section
74 was enacted to regulate situations in which the proper
discharge of public duties may give rise or appear to give rise to
a conflict of interests.
The last substantial revision of this code of ethical conduct was
in 1987, when the Ethics in Government Act2 made major
changes to section 73 of the Public Officers Law, enacted a new
section 73-a requiring annual financial disclosure from all state
officers and many public employees, and shifted advisory and
* Partner of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, New
York, and J.S.D. candidate at Columbia University School of Law,
respectively. The authors thank George F. Carpinello, Esq., Charles King,
Esq. and Todd Norbitz, Esq. for valuable contributions to this article.1. Act of April 14, 1954, ch. 695-98, 1954 N.Y. Laws 955 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAWv §§ 73, 74, 166 (McKinney 1988)). The
substantive provisions were contained in sections 73, Business or professional
activities by state officers and employees and party officers, and 74, Code of
Ethics of the Public Officers Law.
2. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, §§ 2, 3, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404,
1404, 1411 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAWV §§ 73, 73-a
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991); Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 7,
1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1421 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991)).
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enforcement authority for the Code of Ethics contained in Public
Officers Law section 74 from the attorney general3 to a new State
Ethics Commission. 4 Public Officers Law section 74 was not
amended at that time.
The New York State Ethics Commission (Commission) adopted
several implementing rules as part 932, entitled Outside
Activities, effective April 11, 1990. 5 The stated purpose of part
932 is "[t]o ensure compliance by policy-makers and certain
others with the conflict of interest prohibitions of sections 73 and
74 of the Public Officers Law by promulgating rules concerning
restrictions on outside activities."
6
Rule 932.2 is entitled Restrictions on Policy-makers and
Certain Others Holding Positions of Officer or Member of
Political Party Organizations. It provides:
(a) No head of a State department, individual who serves as
one of the four statewide elected officials, individual who serves
in a policy-making position or member or director of a public
authority (other than a multi-state authority), public benefit
corporation or commission at least one of whose members is
appointed by the Governor shall serve as an officer of any
political party or political organization.
(b) No head of a State department, individual who serves as
one of the four statewide elected officials, individual who serves
in a policy-making position or member or director of a public
authority (other than a multi-state authority), public benefit
corporation or commission at least one of whose members is
appointed by the Governor shall serve as a member of any
political party committee including political party district leader
3. N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 63(11), 74 (McKinney 1982), added by Act of
April 14, 1954, ch. 698, 1954 N.Y. Laws 959 (McKinney) and repealed by
Ethics in Government Act, ch. 108, § 1, 1988 N.Y. Laws 234, 235
(McKinney).
4. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
5. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 932 (1990).
6. Notice of Adoption, 12 N.Y. St. Reg. 15 (Apr. 11, 1990). The term
"outside activities" is not defined in any relevant statute, in part 932, in other
rules of the State Ethics Committee in title 19 of the New York Compilation of
Codes, Rules and Regulations, in case law, nor in any advisory opinions of the
[Vol 8
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(however designated) or member of the national committee of a
political party.7
The stated statutory authority for part 932 is New York
Executive Law section 94(16)(a). 8 Section 94 of the Executive
Law, newly enacted by section 7 of the Ethics in Government
Act, 9 created and empowered the State Ethics Commission.
Section 94(16) provides that, in addition to any other powers and
duties specified by law, the Commission shall have the power and
duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning restrictions on outside ac-
tivities and limitations on the receipt of honoraria by persons
subject to its jurisdiction .. .. " 10
Rule 932.2 raises at least four substantial legal issues, which
are explored by this Article. Part I of this Article explores the
consequences of violations of rule 932.2 and shows that
apparently there are no penalties or other consequences of a
violation. Part II examines the history of the legislature's own
decisions about which public officers should be excluded from
political party office holding. It argues that in purporting to deny
to prospective and possibly sitting public officers not already
proscribed by statute the opportunity or right to continue or
assume certain political party offices, this rule may well be ultra
vires. Part Il examines the legislature's careful distinctions in the
Ethics in Government Act of 1987 and a subsequent amendment
between full-time salaried public officers and other public
officers. It concludes that, even if not ultra vires as to all public
officers, rule 932.2 would appear to be ultra vires as applied to
uncompensated part-time public officers. Part IV analyzes the
state's separation of powers doctrine as enunciated by the New
York Court of Appeals and concludes that the rule, even if within
Ethics Commission issued on or before January 10, 1991.
7. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 19, § 932.2 (1990) (emphasis
added).
8. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(16)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991); Notice of
Adoption, 12 N.Y. St. Reg. 15 (Apr. 11, 1990).
9. Ethics in Government Act, cl. 813, § 7, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1421
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94 (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
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the validly delegated authority of the State Ethics Commission,
has been construed by it to encompass policy-making activity
which runs afoul of the constitutionally required separation of
powers.
I. CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS
Rule 932.7, adopted by the State Ethics Commission
simultaneously with rule 932.2, provides:
In addition to any penalty contained in any provision of law, a
knowing and intentional violation of this Part by an individual
subject to it may result in appropriate action taken by the State
Ethics Commission or referral by it to the individual's
appointing authority. The appointing authority, after such a
referral, may take disciplinary action which may include a fine,
suspension without pay or removal from office or employment in
the manner provided by law.
11
No statute or regulation indicates what "appropriate action" by
the State Ethics Commission under rule 932.7 might be.
Furthermore, there appears to be no authority for adoption or
implementation of this rule. 12 As we have seen, section 94 of the
New York Executive Law establishes the State Ethics
Commission, its functions, powers and duties.13 It also
establishes the penalties authorized for violation of the Ethics in
Government Act. 14 Subdivision 16(a) of section 94 authorizes the
Commission to "[piromulgate rules concerning restrictions on
outside activities ... by persons subject to its jurisdiction." 15
11. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGs. tit. 19, § 932.7 (1990).
12. Legislation now pending in the New York State Senate would provide
for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for violations of rules contained in part
932, assuming, of course, the rules are authorized under New York law. S.
6448, 214th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1991). Senate bill 6448, section 3, would also
authorize the Commission to refer violations of such rules for prosecution but
would not authorize the Commission to take any other action, appropriate or
otherwise, in respect to such violations. S. 6448 § 3 ; see infra note 16.
13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
15. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 94(16)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
[Vol 8
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Subdivision 16(a) then limits the Commission's authority to
penalize persons for violating any such rule with the following
proviso: "a violation of such rules in and of itself shall not be
punishable pursuant to subdivision thirteen of this section unless
the conduct constituting the violation would otherwise constitute a
violation of this section." 16 Subdivision 13 of section 94 contains
the only penalty provisions found in the Ethics in Government
Act, so subdivision 16(a) would not seem to authorize penalties
beyond those authorized by subdivision 13. In order for the
penalties authorized by subdivision 13 to apply, a violation of the
Commission's rule prohibiting a person from holding political
party office must constitute a violation of or under Executive
Law, section 94 itself. 17 Since section 94 does not have a
provision restricting the holding of a political party office, the
relevant penalties in subdivision 13 do not apply by the terms of
subdivision 16(a).18
Nor do they apply by the terms of subdivision 13.1 9
16. Id. The State Ethics Commission apparently has recognized the
limitations this proviso places upon the enforcement of rules which do not
track the substance of Executive Law, section 94. Senate bill 6448, introduced
on July 4, 1991 at the request of the governor, would (1) repeal this proviso of
Executive Law, section 94 (16)(a); (2) specifically authorize the Commission
to receive and investigate complaints alleging violation of rules promulgated
pursuant to section 94(16)(a); and (3) make persons who knowingly and
intentionally violate such rules subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 under
section 94(13). See S. 6448 §§ 1, 2, 3 (1991).
The Governor's proposal of this bill would seem to confirm the conclusion
that the current penalty provisions of the Ethics in Government Act do not
provide for or authorize imposition of sanctions for violations of rules
promulgated by the Commission which do not also constitute violations of the
statute.
Although enactment of this bill would provide a penalty for violations of
Ethics rule 932.2, cf. infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text, it would not
provide a basis for other penalties ostensibly authorized by rule 932.7. See
supra text accompanying note 12. It also would not provide authority for the
substance of rule 932.2 insofar as the rule exceeds the scope of Public Officers
Law, section 73(9). See infra notes 35-131 and accompanying text.
17. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94(13), (16)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
18. See supra notes 12, 16.
19. Subdivision 13 would be amended by Senate bill 6448 to authorize
only (1) civil penalties of up to $10,000 or (2) reference to the appropriate
1991]
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Subdivision 13 of section 94 provides that an individual who
knowingly and intentionally violates specified provisions of
section 73 of the Public Officers Law, knowingly and wilfully
fails to file an annual statement of financial disclosure, or
knowingly and wilfully makes a false statement or gives false in-
formation on an annual statement of financial disclosure with
intent to deceive shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount
not to exceed $10,000.20 Subdivision 13 also provides that
certain violations are punishable as Class A misdemeanors, which
could result in imprisonment for up to one year.21 Because
violation of rule 932.2 by holding a political office while, for
example, serving as a member of a public benefit corporation is
not a violation of section 73, 73-a, or 74 of the Public Officers
Law, none of the aforementioned subdivision 13 penalties apply.
Subdivision 1322 also provides that the Commission shall adopt
"rules relating to the assessment of the civil penalties herein
authorized"23 and provides further:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no other
penalty, civil or criminal may be imposed for a failure to file, or
for a false filing, of such statement, or a violation of section
seventy-three of the public officers law, except that the
appointing authority may impose disciplinary action as otherwise
provided by law.24
On its face, this restriction does not relate to violations of regu-
lations which do not also constitute violations of sections 7325 or
prosecutor for knowing and intentional violations of regulations lawfully
adopted by the Commission. S. 6448, 214th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1991); see
supra notes 12, 16.
20. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added). Senate bill 6448 states explicitly that no penalty
other than the ones set forth in subdivision 13 of Executive Law, section 94,
may be imposed for violations of any rules promulgated pursuant to Executive
Law, section 94(16)(a). S. 6448, 214th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1991).
25. Section 73 provides in subdivision (6)(c):
Any such legislative employee who knowingly and wilfully with intent
to deceive makes a false statement or gives information which he knows
[Vol 8
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73-a 26 of the Public Officers Law. Furthermore, it certainly does
not authorize penalties for any such regulatory violation,27 and
does evidence a strong legislative policy that, except as explicitly
provided by the statute, the only penalties available under the
Ethics in Government statute should be disciplinary action that
"the appointing authority may impose.., as otherwise provided
by law." 28
As these provisions show, the legislature did not authorize the
State Ethics Commission to impose any additional penalties for
violation of rules it might promulgate, unless such violations also
constitute violations of the statutes, and then only to the extent of
the penalties set forth in subdivision 13 of Executive Law section
94. Therefore, a violation of rule 932.2, other than violation by a
judge, attorney-general or other public officer covered by Public
Officers Law, section 73(9),29 is punishable only "as otherwise
provided by law." '30
Hence, our conclusion is that the Commission has gone beyond
its authority in its attempt to authorize, by rule 932.7, fines or
to be false in any written statement required to be filed pursuant to this
subdivision, shall be assessed a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
ten thousand dollars. Assessment of a civil penalty shall be made by the
legislative ethics committee in accordance with the provisions of
subdivision twelve of section eighty of the legislative law. For a
violation of this subdivision, the committee may, in lieu of a civil
penalty, refer a violation to the appropriate prosecutor and upon
conviction, but only after such referral, such violation shall b-n
punishable as a class A misdemeanor.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(6)(c) (McKinney 1988).
26. Section 73-a provides in subdivision (4):
A reporting individual who knowingly and wilfully with intent to
deceive makes a false statement or gives information which such
individual knows to be false on such statement of financial disclosure
filed pursuant to this section shall be subject to a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
27. See supra note 24.
28. N.Y. Exec. Law § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
29. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying text.
30. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1991). This is so even if
Senate bill 6448 is enacted.
1991]
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suspension from office without pay for violations of rule 932.2
that are not also violations of Public Officers Law, section
73(9).31
The question then is what, if any, "disciplinary action" the
appropriate appointing authority is authorized to take with respect
to a public officer subject to rule 932.2. Obviously, there are
many appointing authorities in the state government and this
Article cannot canvass them all. But to take the common case of
public officers appointed by the governor, we are unaware of any
provision of law which generally authorizes the governor to fine
or suspend his appointees. 3
2
What is the governor's power of removal? One starts with the
New York State Constitution which states: "When the duration of
any office is not provided by this constitution it may be declared
by law, and if not so declared, such office shall be held during
the pleasure of the authority making the appointment.", 33 The
constitution provides that there is a difference between an office
whose duration is provided by the constitution or declared by law
and an office for which neither provision is made. In the latter
case a public office holder can be removed summarily by the
appointing authority. 34 The constitution implies that this may
31. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying text. While fines of up to
$10,000 could be imposed if Senate bill 6448 is enacted, the Commission still
would have no power to authorize any appointing authority to suspend a public
officer appointee without pay, and we know of no law generally authorizing
suspension of a public officer without pay.
32. Under section 75 of the Civil Service Law, any gubernatorially
appointed public officer or employee designated as holding a policy-making
position by the governor and in the competitive or non-competitive class of the
classified service of the state could be fined up to $100 or suspended without
pay for up to two months for misconduct. N.Y. CIrv. SRV. LAW §75(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1991). Such officers and employees would not include most
gubernatorial appointees who will be in either the exempt class of the classified
service, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1983), or the unclassified
service, id. § 35.
33. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
34. Ryan v. Wells, 178 N.Y. 135, 136, 70 N.E. 218, 219 (1904) (per
curiam) (office of deputy tax commissioner held during the pleasure of
authority making appointment) (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. X, § 3;
renumbered art. XIII, § 6, Nov. 8, 1938; renumbered art. XIII, § 2, Nov. 6,
[Vol 8
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not be so for public office holders whose terms are set by
constitution or other law.
This implication is confirmed by an analysis of the removal
provisions contained in the Public Officers Law. 35 There are two
principal methods of removal of gubernational appointees. The
first relates to those appointed with the advice and consent of the
senate:
An officer appointed by the governor by and with the advice and
consent of the senate, except an officer who is or any or either of
the officers who are the head of a department, and except as oth-
erwise provided by special provision of law may be removed by
the senate upon the recommendation of the governor. 36
This section also provides that the governor, before making a
recommendation to the senate for the removal of any officer, may
in his discretion take proofs for the purpose of determining
whether such recommendation shall be made.37 Thus, the
governor may not act alone to remove an officer whose
appointment must be approved by the senate, other than a head of
department, 3 8 and there is a clear implication that the governor
must have some basis for recommending the removal to the
senate.
The Public Officers Law also makes special provisions for re-
moval of public officers appointed solely by the governor for a
term:
An officer appointed by the governor for a full term .
whose appointment is not required by law to be made by and
with the advice and consent of the senate . . . may be removed
by the governor within the term for which such officer shall
have been chosen, after giving to such officer a copy of the
charges against him and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense.39
1962).
35. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 32-36 (McKinney 1988).
36. Id. § 32 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 33-a.
39. Id. § 33(1) (emphasis added); cf Gere v. Vhitlock, 92 N.Y. 191
1991]
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This provision also implies that if the officer is appointed by
the governor for a fixed term, even if her appointment is not
approved by the senate, the governor must have some "charges"
or cause on which to base the removal.
This analysis is supported by an observation made by then
Chief Judge Breitel toward the end of the New York Court of
Appeals opinion in Rapp v. Carey.40 In this case, the court of
appeals held that a dual public-political party office prohibition
promulgated by a gubernatorial executive order exceeded the
express terms of then sections 73(8)41 and 73(6)42 of the Public
Officers Law and, therefore, was not authorized. 43 The court
stated:
None of this is to say that the Governor may not require
that his appointees, serving at his will, abstain from transactions
or business associations that potentially conflict with State
duties. The Governor is, of course, free to regulate the business
activities of employees serving at his pleasure. The same cannot
be said, however, of employees who have civil service tenure, or
even gubernatorial appointees who serve for fixed terms. These
employees may not be removable except for cause, and are thus
not subject to summary dismissal by the Governor. The
challenged executive order exceeds the Governor's power of
appointment and reaches employees who could be neither
directly appointed nor summarily dismissed by the Governor. As
to these employees, the GoVernor is without power to impose the
(1883) (an officer has no right to a hearing before dismissal unless such right
has been granted by the legislature or the state constitution).
40. 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
41. Section 73(8) provided: "No party officer while serving as such shall
be eligible to serve as a judge of any court of record, attorney-general, district
attorney or assistant district attorney." Act of April 24, 1964, ch. 941, § 6,
1964 N.Y. Laws 1679, 1685 (McKinney), renumbered by Act of July 20,
1965, ch. 1012, § 2, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1486, 1487 (McKinney), and amended
and renumbered as subdivision (9) by Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2,
1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404 (McKinney).
42. Section 73(6) then provided for annual written disclosures of certain
financial interests by members of the legislature and legislative employees. Act
of July 20, 1965, ch. 1012, § 3, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1486, 1488 (McKinney).
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strictures contained in the executive order.44
The court cited no authority for these observations.
Nevertheless, as implied by Chief Judge Breitel, it is difficult to
believe that the governor could, by executive order, in effect
remove a public officer other than one serving at his pleasure or
require his resignation without presenting his case to the senate, 45
or to the appointee if the senate's approval were not necessary for
the appointment. 46 If that is so, it is equally difficult to believe
that the governor's appointees, in this case members of the State
Ethics Commission, could in effect do so by regulation. 47
44. Id. at 165, 375 N.E.2d at 749-50, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (emphasis
added).
45. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 32 (McKinney 1988).
46. See id. § 33(1).
47. We have found no New York authority squarely on point. The
separation of powers cases discussed infra hold that an executive agency's rule-
making authority may not exceed the constitutional or statutory authority
conferred on the governor to execute and implement the laws enacted by the
legislature and interpreted by the judiciary. See infra notes 110-48 and
accompanying text.
One of the counsel in Rapp did perceive the relationship between the
appointment and removal powers and the governor's effort by executive order
to impose disciplinary regulations on a very large class of state officers and
employees," but the New York cases cited do not seem on point. Brief for
Appellant, at 63, Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404
N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief Rapp]. Nevertheless, there
is a relationship.
On the federal level, a Memorandum Opinion of a United States Assistant
Attorney General thoughtfully analyzes the interrelationship of the president's
removal power and congress' power to delegate to an executive agency, over
which the president has only limited control, authority to take disciplinary
action against executive branch employees. The assistant attorney general
advised that congress may not take from the president the ultimate authority to
act. 2 Op. Office of Leg. Counsel 107 (1978). If the reasoning of the assistant
attorney general were applied to the State Ethics Commission's adoption of
rule 932.2, it would follow that even an explicit legislative delegation to the
Commission of removal power over gubernatorial appointees serving at the
governor's pleasure would impermissibly interfere with the governor's "duty
faithfully to execute the laws." Id. at 109.
Moreover, the removal powers of the United States President with respect to
officers appointed with the advice and consent of the senate or for a term are
different from those of the New York State Governor. Under Myers v. United
1991]
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Because of the phrase in Public Officers Law section 33(1),
"within the term for which such officer shall have been
chosen," ' 48 this section presumably does not apply to a public
officer who has been appointed by the governor alone but not for
a definite term. Nor does it appear to apply to a public officer to
whom the section otherwise applies but who is holding over after
expiration of her term pursuant to Public Officers Law section
5.49
But until the governor does appoint a successor, neither he nor
any gubernatorial appointee may, directly or indirectly, effect a
removal other than in accordance with section 32 or 33(1). This
presumably is what Chief Judge Breitel had in mind in the Rapp
dictum quoted above.50
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the president's unilateral removal power, even
over officers appointed by and with the advice and consent of the senate, is
considerable. See L. TRIME, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 4-9 at 186-91
(1st ed. 1978) (discussing the president's powers of removal as chief
executive). Under New York Public Officers Law' section 32, the governor can
only recommend removal of such officers to the senate, and under section 33,
the governor can remove appointees for a definite term only for cause after
notice and a hearing. Thus, it seems very unlikely that the legislature would
have conferred on the State Ethics Commission any authority over executive
appointees protected by Public Officers Law sections 32 and 33 that might lead
to their dismissal unless it had done so explicitly, which it did not.
48. This phrase does not appear in section 32, which relates to the removal
by the senate of officers appointed by the governor by and with the advice and
consent of the senate. Nor does any phrase like it appear in any other relevant
provision.
49. In the case of holdovers this distinction between the governor's power
to remove with and without cause is one without a difference because the
Public Officers Law provides that "the office [of a holdover] shall be deemed
vacant for the purpose of choosing his successor." N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 5
(McKinney 1988). Thus, whether a holdover is an officer appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the senate or an officer appointed for a term,
the governor can simply appoint a successor and need not resort to removal.
50. Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 165, 375 N.E.2d 745, 749-50, 404
N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1978); see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
[Vol 8
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II. IS RULE 932.2 SUBSTANTIVELY
ULTRA WREP.
An explicit prohibition concerning dual public and party office
holding is found in Public Officers Law section 73(9) as amended
by the Ethics In Government Act.51 It provides:
No party officer while serving as such shall be eligible to
serve as a judge of any court of record, attorney-general or
deputy or assistant attorney-general or solicitor general, district
attorney or assistant district attorney. As used in this
subdivision, the term "party officer" shall mean a member of a
national committee, an officer or member of a state committee or
a county chairman of any political party.52
The legislature's intent to limit the class of public officials
prohibited by section 73 from simultaneously holding a political
party office is affirmed in the legislative history of section
73(9).53 The dual-role prohibition was originally adopted as
subdivision 5 of newly enacted section 73, Business or
professional activities by state officers and employees and party
officers, in 1954.54 Subdivision 5 limited the scope of the "dual-
role" prohibition to judges, the attorney general, and
prosecutors. The legislature subsequently amended section 73 on
seven separate occasions. 55 Aside from redesignating subdivision
51. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAv § 73(9) (McKinney Supp. 1991), amended by
Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404
(McKinney).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Not even the most detailed section-by-section analysis of the Ethics in
Government Act found in the Governor's Bill Jacket of chapter 813 of the
1987 New York Laws. comments on the amendment of section 73, subdivision
9 of Public Officers Law, subdivision 9 of section 73. It therefore seems most
unlikely that anyone perceived this amendment as effecting any change in the
statute's basic policy, nor indeed any significant substantive change.
54. Act of April 14, 1954, ch. 695, § 1, 1954 N.Y. Laws 955, 955
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988)).
55. See Act of April 24, 1964, ch. 941, § 6, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1679, 1685
(McKinney) (omitting legislative employees and members of legislature from
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 6); Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1012, §§ 1-3, 1965 N.Y.
Laws 1468, 1486-1488 (McKinney) (defining legislative employee and
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5 of section 73 as subdivision 8,56 the legislature has
substantively amended the dual-role provision only once in this
thirty-seven year period, when it enacted the Ethics in
Government Act.57 Then, as part of its program to establish
"strong ethical standards to govern the conduct of public officers
and employees in all three branches of government," ' 58 the
legislature revisited the scope of the dual-role provision then
codified in section 73(8). But the legislature did not broaden the
class of public officials subject to the rule. It simply added
deputy and assistant attorney-general and solicitor generals to the
prohibited offices and redesignated the provision as subdivision 9
of section 73,59 thus maintaining the limitation of the provision's
scope to licensed attorneys who are officers of the court as well
as of the state.
We know of only two other occasions where the legislature has
regulatory agency, adding terms to subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, redesignating
subdivisions 4, 5, 6 as 7, 8, 9, adding subdivision 5, 6 and 10); Act of May
31, 1968, ch. 420, § 244, 1968 N.Y. Laws 721, 780 (McKinney) (changing
term department of public works to department of transportation in subdivision
7); Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 940, § 2, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1444, 1444
(McKinney) (redefining minor child in subdivision 6(a)(1)); Act of July 27,
1983, ch. 764, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1430, 1430 (McKinney) (adding to
definition of state agency in subdivision 1 public benefit corporation and
public authority); Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, §§ 2, 3, 20, 1987 N.Y.
Laws 1404, 1404, 1411, 1454 (McKinney) (adding new terms to section 73,
subdivision 1 through 14, redesignating subdivision 8 as subdivision 9, and
adding thereto offices of deputy or assistant attorney general or solicitor
general, newly enacting section 73-a); Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 242, §§ 1, 2,
1989 N.Y. Laws 609, 610 (McKinney) (deleting members of board of regents
and other uncompensated and per diem members or directors from subdivision
1, paragraph (i), (iii), and (iv), adding terms to subdivisions 3, 4 and 8).
56. Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1012, § 2, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1486, 1487
(McKinney).
57. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 73, 73-a (McKinney 1988)).
58. Executive Memorandum, Ethics in Government Act and New York
State Governmental Accountability, Audit and Internal Control Act of 1987,
reprinted in 1987 N.Y. Laws 2727 (McKinney).
59. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 73, 73-a (McKinney 1988)).
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regulated the holding of a public and political party office.60
Section 94(2) of the Executive Law, as enacted by the Ethics In
Government Act, provides that no member of the State Ethics
Commission can be a political party office holder. Section 2590-
c(4) of the Education Law provides that New York City
Community School District board members may not be political
party office holders. 6 1 These recent enactments, like Public
Officers Law section 73(9), are carefully limited to specific
public offices where special measures are deemed necessary to
ensure incorruptibility. 62
The fact that the legislature has chosen very specific and
limited regulation of those public officers subject to a political
party officer prohibition is inconsistent with the astounding
breadth of rule 932.2. The rule prohibits heads of state
60. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991), amended
by Act of Dec. 19, 1988, ch. 739, § 3, 1988 N.Y. Laws 1551, 1552
(McKinney); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991), enacted by
Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 7, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1421
(McKinney).
Presumably the Commission promulgated rule 932.2 because of its concern
about potential conflict of interests for anyone acting simultaneously in one of
the enumerated party offices and one of the covered public offices. However,
in the absence of a specific validly adopted applicable ethics standard, nothing
in state law would prohibit such dual office holding. See N.Y. Att'y Gen. Op
91-32 (City employees, one of whom is the tax assessor, may serve as
coordinators of 1991 election campaign for city political party absent
applicable prohibition in city's code of ethics, so long as they recuse
themselves from any matter arising in the course of their public duties which
raises a specific conflict of interests or appearance of impropriety.)
61. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
62. The restrictions on New York City Community School District board
members in Education Law section 2590-c(4) have been upheld against United
States constitutional challenge. Fletcher v. Marino, 882 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.
1989). Similar restrictions in 1989 New York City Charter section 2604(b)(15)
have withstood state as well as federal constitutional challenge. Molinaro v.
Conflicts of Interest Bd., No. CV-90-0067 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (1991 US
Dist. LEXIS 1913) (1989 New York City Charter provision prohibiting certain
high-ranking city officials from simultaneously holding leadership positions in
any political party upheld against federal constitutional challenge); Golden v.
Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990) (same New
York City Charter provision upheld against state constitutional challenge).
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departments, statewide elected officials, all policy-makers, 63 and
members or directors of public authorities, public benefit
corporations, or commissions from serving as a political party or
organization officer or from being a member of a political party
committee. The legislature has carefully and repeatedly regulated
political party office holding by public officers, including by the
same comprehensive statutory revision in which it made the
delegation of authority relied upon by the Commission. As a
consequence, one must seriously doubt whether the legislature, in
delegating to the State Ethics Commission the power further to
regulate public officer "outside activities," intended that phrase
to cover political party office holding.
Moreover, there is persuasive authority that rule 932.2 is not
63. Under the Commission's Guidelines for Determination of Persons in
Policy-Making Positions, such persons include every individual, regardless of
compensation, who:
(a) has been determined to be managerial pursuant to Civil Service Law
section 201, subdivision 7 because he or she formulates policy; or
(b) is in the non-competitive class of the classified service of the State of
New York under section 2.2 and whose position is designated in appendix 2 of
the rules and regulations of the Department of Civil Service as requiring the
performance of functions influencing policy; or
(c) exercises responsibilities of a broad scope in the formulation of plans for
the implementation of goals or policy for a state agency (as defined in New
York Public Officer Law section 73(1)(g)), or acts as an advisor to an
individual in such a position. See Ethics Advisory Notice 90-1, Designation of
Policy-Makers, Guideline 2 (1989).
The Commission's interpretation of this guideline may be influenced by New
York Executive Law, section 94(9)(k), which prevents the commission from
granting an exemption from the requirement to file an annual disclosure
statement to any state employee earning more than the amount specified
(currently about $54,000) who, although not determined by his appointing
authority to hold a policy-making position, has duties that involve the
negotiation, authorization or approval of:
(i) contracts, leases, franchises, revocable consents, concessions, variances,
special permits, licenses,
(ii) the purchase, sale, rental or lease of real property, goods or services, or
contracts therefor,
(iii) grants of money or loans, or
(iv) rules of regulations having the force of law.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 94(9)(k) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
[Vol 8
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/3
RULE 932.2
authorized by either section 73 or section 74 of the Public
Officers Law. In Rapp v. Carey,64 the New York Court of
Appeals considered whether then section 73 or 74 of the Public
Officers Law authorized the governor, using inherent
gubernatorial powers, to prohibit a public officer from holding a
political party office beyond the statutory proscriptions of then
section 73(8), the predecessor of section 73(9). The court held
that neither section authorized such regulation. 65
Governor Carey had promulgated an executive order in 1976
that required the filing of financial disclosure statements beyond
the requirements of then section 73(6) of the Public Officers Law
and prohibited a broad class of public officials from
simultaneously holding political party office, 66 thus far exceeding
the limited proscriptions of then section 73(8) of the Public
Officers Law. 67 In support of his order, the governor made two
arguments: (1) the order is a valid exercise of his authority to
oversee the executive branch, and (2) the order implements
legislative policy.
In support of the first argument, the governor cited In re
DiBrizzi,68 which sustained the governor's and attorney general's
statutory authority to create a State Crime Commission. 69 Which
did not involve the exercise by public officers of a generalized
regulatory or inherent authority. 70 The governor also cited Evans
v. Carey7 1 in support of the first argument. 72 That case did
64. 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
65. Id. at 164-65, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
66. Exec. Order No. 10.1, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 9, § 3.10
(1976).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
68. 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464 (1951); see Appellant's Brief Rapp,
supra note 47, at 14.
69. Dibrizzi, 303 N.Y. at 216, 101 N.E.2d at 469.
70. The court stated: "The purpose of the investigation is to secure
information to guide executive action, not to indict or punish any individuals."
Id. at 216-17, 101 N.E.2d at 469.
71. 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976)
(rejecting federal constitutional challenges to gubernatorial executive order
requiring financial disclosures of public officers and employees).
72. See Appellant's Brief Rapp, supra note 47, at 18.
1991]
17
Josephson and Ross: Rule 932.2
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
sustain the governor's exercise of inherent authority to require
financial disclosure from certain state public officers. 73 But three
of the seven judges concurred only because the issue of whether
or not a statute rather than an executive order was required was
not raised and briefed by the parties. 74
In support of his second argument, that the executive order im-
plemented legislative policy, the governor relied on Public
Officers Law section 74,75 which is related to section 73 and its
predecessor section, and the Executive Law, which gives the
governor authority "'to examine and investigate the management
and affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of
the State.' 76 This argument persuaded the two dissenting
judges, 77 but not the majority. 78
Although the governor's brief failed to point out the existing
statutory prohibition on political party office holding by public
officers in then section 73, subdivision 8 of Public Officers
Law, 79 the court specifically discussed its relevance in rejecting
73. Evans, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976).
74. Id. at 1009, 359 N.E.2d at 984, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring); see also Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 161, 375 N.E.2d 745,
747, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1978) (gubernatorial order requiring financial
disclosure by a wide range of state employees was unconstitutional because it
was not authorized by the state legislature).
75. See Appellant's Brief Rapp, supra note 47, at 23.
76. Appellant's Brief Rapp, supra note 47, at 23 (quoting N.Y. EXEc.
LAW § 6 (McKinney 1982)).
77. Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d at 171-72, 175-76, 375 N.E.2d at 753-54,
756, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 573-74, 576 (Cooke, J., dissenting in part in a separate
opinion; Jansen, J., dissenting in a separate opinion).
78. Id. at 164-65, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
79. Section 73(8) then provided:
No party officer while serving as such shall be eligible to serve as a
judge of any court of record, attorney general, district attorney or
assistant district attorney. As used in this subdivision the term "party
officer" shall mean a member of a national committee, an officer or
member of a state committee or a county chairman of any political
party.
Act of April 24, 1964, ch. 941, § 6, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1679, 1685
(McKinney), renumbered by Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1012, § 2, 1965 N.Y.
Laws 1468, 1487 (McKinney).
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the governor's argument. 80 The court concluded that in section
73 "the Legislature demonstrated its ability and readiness to
proscribe specified transactions peculiarly vulnerable to conflicts
of interest, transactions in 'definable areas on which there should
be no disagreement[,]"' 81 and that "[tihe prohibited conduct and
the employees to which each prohibition applies are carefully de-
scribed."' 82 Accordingly, section 73(8) provided no statutory au-
thority for the executive order. 83
The court also concluded that Public Officers Law section 74,
entitled Code of Ethics, was not statutory authority for the dual-
role regulation and did not authorize the executive order. 84 The
court explained that the legislative intent of section 74 was to
provide general standards of conduct which could be flexibly
administered by rules that determined conflicts of interest on a
case-by-case basis. 85 "The crux of the matter is the determination
by the Legislature, implicit in its enactment of the Code of
Ethics, that the existence of conflicts in these areas is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, not by use of blanket
prohibitions."' 86 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
"inflexible proscriptions" 87 of the executive order, far from
being an implementation of section 74, constituted "a
nullification of it. ' ' 88 The court stated: "The restriction on
political activities is particularly troublesome. While the
restriction on the merits would be supported by many or even
most, it involves a broad question of policy, hardly resolvable by
other than the representatively elected lawmaking branch of
80. Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 164-65, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at
568-69.
81. Id. at 164, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (quoting
Memorandum of Governor Thomas E. Dewe4 on Approval of chapters 695-
698, reprinted in 1954 N.Y. Laws 1408 (McKinney)).
82. Id. at 164, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
83. Id. at 165, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 164-65, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
86. Id. at 165, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
87. Id. at 164, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
88. Id. at 165, 375 N.E.2d at 749, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
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government, the Legislature." 89
Rapp can be distinguished from the instant case only by the fact
that the Commission rather than the governor is acting and that it
is acting pursuant to a statutory rather than an inherent, state
constitutional, rule-making authority. Neither seems to be a
persuasive reason for a different result from that in Rapp. All of
the members of the Commission are appointed to terms by the
governor without the advice and consent of the senate and are
subject to removal by the governor after written notice and
opportunity to reply. 90 The Commission, therefore, is nearly the
equivalent of the governor. The statutory authority pursuant to
which the Commission is acting is a completely generalized rule-
making authority. In Evans v. Carey,91 the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the federal constitutional challenges to the
governor requiring financial disclosures of public officers and
employees. Three judges of the court were careful to reserve the
issue of whether "a statute requiring financial disclosures . . . is
required" ' 92 because the issue had not been raised. The issue was
raised in Rapp. The court searched the New York State
Constitution and statutes for "express or implied authority for the
Governor to exact of state employees compliance with the
requirements" of his executive order. 93 As we have seen, the
court held that a statute was required. It observed:
In fact, even the Legislature is powerless to delegate the
legislative function unless it provides adequate standards.
(Packer Coll. Inst. v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y.
184, 189). Without such standards there is no government of
law, but only government of men left to set their own standards,
with resultant authoritarian possibilities. 94
89. Id. at 165, 375 N.E.2d at 750, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
90. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW. § 94(2), (3), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
91. 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976).
92. Id. at 1009, 359 N.E.2d at 984, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (concurring
memorandum); see supra note 71.
93. Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 160, 375 N.E.2d 745, 746, 404
N.Y.S.2d 565, 566.
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The court noted that prior executive orders "were repetitive of
existing legislation as to standards and implemented the en-
forcement of those standards by [imposing no new sanctions]
... . -5 The court concluded this section of its opinion by
adding: "Where it would be practicable for the Legislature itself
to set precise standards, the executive's flexibility is and should
be quite limited. "96
We, therefore, believe that a rule promulgated by a
governmental agency of the executive pursuant to a generalized
rule-making statutory authority, which itself contains no
standards whatsoever, does not meet the Rapp tests.
II. IS RULE 932.2 ULTRA VIRES
WHEN APPLIED TO UNCOMPENSATED
PART-TIME PUBLIC OFFICERS?
The New York State Legislature has exempted all uncompen-
sated or per diem public officers from the regulation of Public
Officers Law section 73 with one limited exception. 97 Section
73(1)(i) states:
(i) The term "state officer or employee"
shall mean:
(i) heads of state departments and their deputies and assistants
other than members of the board of regents of the university of
the state of New York who receive no compensation or are
compensated on a per diem basis;
(ii) officers and employees of statewide elected officials;
(iii) officers and employees of state departments, boards,
bureaus, divisions, commissions, councils or other state agencies
other than officers of such boards, commissions or councils who
receive no compensation or are compensated on a per diem
basis; and
(iv) members or directors of public authorities, other than
95. Id. at 163, 375 N.E.2d at 748, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (emphasis
added).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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multi-state authorities, public benefit corporations and com-
missions at least one of whose members is appointed by the
governor, who receive such compensation other than on a per
diem basis, and employees of such authorities, corporations and
commissions. 9 8
Section 73(1)(i)(iv) was newly enacted by the Ethics In
Government Act. 99 The exemptions made for other uncompen-
sated and per diem officials in section 73 subdivision 1, subpara-
graphs (i) and (iii) were enacted as amendments to section 73 in
1989.100 The Memorandum of State Executive Department
accompanying Chapter 242101 evidences the enactors' intent to
exclude all uncompensated or per diem officials from the general
scope of section 73 of the Public Officers Law and points out that
State Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion No. 88-2 is
consistent with this intent:
Under the Act, a question has been raised whether the
definition of "state officer or employee" should include non-paid
or per diem members of State commissions, boards or councils
as subject to § 73 of the Public Officers Law. The Commission
addressed this question in its Advisory Opinion No. 88-2, and
concluded that no clear legislative intent existed to lead the
Commission to conclude that those individuals should be covered
by § 73. Currently, members or directors of public authorities,
public benefit corporations and commissions, at least one of
whom is appointed by the Governor, who receive compensation
on other than a per diem basis, are subject to POL § 73.
Members or directors who receive a per diem payment, or who
are unpaid, are not covered by POL § 73.
However, members of other state commissions or boards or
councils are not similarly excluded. Recognizing the importance
of public-spirited citizens serving on boards and councils without
98. Id. § 73(1)(i) (emphasis added).
99. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 2, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404, 1404
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB OFF. LAW §§ 73, 73-a (McKinney 1988)).
100. Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 242, § 1, 1989 N.Y. Laws 609, 610
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
101. Executive Memorandum, Ethics in Government, reprinted in 1989
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pay, or for a modest per diem, and weighing the fact that
similarly situated members or directors of public benefit
corporations and public authorities are not subject to POL § 73,
this amendment would clarify that non-paid or per diem
members of state boards or councils are not subject to POL §
73.102
There is only one limited exception to this exclusion. An
uncompensated member or director of a public authority or public
benefit corporation 10 3  must file a financial disclosure
statement. 1° 4 Public Officers Law section 73-a, subdivision
l(c)(iii) requires "members or directors of public authorities,
other than multi-state authorities, public benefit corporations...
and employees . . . who hold policy-making positions, as
determined annually by the appointing authority . . ." to file
annual financial disclosure statements. 105 This required disclo-
sure is obviously unlike the substantive prohibitions of specific
activities which are the subject of section 73.106 Public Officers
Law section 73, subdivision 3(b) does preclude an officer
N.Y. Laws 2395 (McKinney).
102. Id. (emphasis added except for second "not" in second paragraph
which was emphasized in the original).
103. While the statute exempts members and directors of both public
authorities and "public benefit corporations," only public benefit corporations
have legal status under the General Construction Law. See N.Y. GEN. CONsT.
LAW §§ 65, 66 (McKinney Supp. 1991). Many if not most public corporations
denominated as public authorities are established by the legislature as public
benefit corporations. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 552(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1991) (Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority); 1201(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1991) (New York City Transit Authority); 1263(1)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1991) (Metropolitan Transportation Authority); 1328(1) (McKinney 1982)
(Central New York Regional Transportation Authority), 1677 (McKinney
Supp. 1991) (Dormitory Authority of the State of New York); 1802(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1991) (New York Job Development Authority); but see
N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW §§ 352(1) (McKinney 1982) (New York State
Thruway Authority is a "public corporation"); 1002(1) (McKinney Supp.
1991) (Power Authority of the State of New York is a "political subdivision of
the statie").
104. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a (McKinney Supp. 1991).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 73(2), (3), (4)(a), (5), (7), (8)
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991).
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required to file a financial disclosure statement pursuant to
section 73-a, but not otherwise subject to the provisions of
section 73, from appearing before the New York State Court of
Claims in an action which is against the interests of his or her
affiliated agency.107 This limited prohibition is narrower than
paragraph (a) of subdivision 3, the parallel provision of section
73, subdivision 3 that precludes salaried state officers and
employees from appearing before the court of claims in any
action against the interest of the state, not just that of a state
agency. 108 Neither section 73(3)(a) or (b) has anything to do with
political party office holding.
The broad scope of rule 932.2 thus appears incompatible with
Public Officers Law section 73, subdivision 1, subparagraphs (i)
and (iv), which generally exempts uncompensated or per diem
members or directors of a public authority, public benefit
corporation or other state agency from section 73 prohibitions. 109
The legislature has carefully confined its regulation of
uncompensated members or directors to the conduct of certain,
not all, court of claims appearances in Public Officer Law section
73, subdivision (3)(b) and to disclosure obligations in Public
Officer Law section 73-a, subdivision (1)(c)(iii). The State Ethics
Commission's prohibition of outside political activities of
uncompensated or per diem members or directors of a public
benefit corporation in rule 932.2 appears to be incompatible with
these narrowly crafted statutory policy determinations.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Assuming rule 932.2 is within the authority of the State Ethics
107. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
108. Id.
109. These part-time members and directors of public authorities and public
benefit corporations were also covered by the Executive Order at issue in Rapp
v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978). Not
only the majority, but also one of the dissenters in that case refused to uphold
the governor's right to prohibit these public officers from holding political
party office, even in light of section 74. Id. at 169-73, 375 N.E.2d at 752-53,
404 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73 (dissenting opinion).
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Commission, it raises substantial issues of separation of powers
and interference with the rights of gubernatorial appointees. The
New York State Constitution distributes governmental powers
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The
constitution vests "[t]he legislative power of this state... in the
senate and assembly[,]' 110 the "executive power . . . in the
governor." 111
The constitution's tripartite system "is designed to achieve a
delicate balance preventing excessive concentration of power in
any one particular branch or person and to insure a representative
form of government."' 112 Accordingly, "[e]ach branch is
separate, independent, and co-equal, possessing inherent powers
to protect itself from impairment of function." 113
As stated by the supreme court in People v. Smith, 114 "[t]he
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is violated when:
one branch of government presumes to exercise the duties and
powers of another branch contrary to constitutional au-
thority."115
That is not to say there can be no overlap of governmental
duties among those branches.1 16 As the court of appeals noted in
110. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1.
111. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Article VI, section 1 provides "There shall
be a unified court system for the state."ld. An analysis of the judicial branch
in relation to the separation of powers doctrine is not relevant for the purposes
of this article.
112. Boreali v. Axelrod, 130 A.D.2d 107, 112, 518 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443
(3d Dep't 1987), aff'd, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464
(1987).
113. Ascione v. City of N.Y., 84 Misc. 2d 414, 419, 379 N.Y.S.2d 599,
606 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1975).
114. 69 Misc. 2d 746, 331 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
115. Id. at 748, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 85. See also Subcontractors Trade Ass'n
v. Koch, 62 N.Y.2d 422, 427, 465 N.E.2d 840, 842, 477 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122
(1984) ("Respect for this structure and the system of checks and balances
inherent therein requires that none of these branlches be allowed to usurp
powers residing entirely in another branch.").
116. See Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797, 495
N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (1985) ("[,V]e have recognized that some overlap between
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People v. Tremaine,117 "common sense and the necessities of
government do not require or permit a captious, doctrinaire, and
inelastic classification of governmental functions." 118
Under New York's separation of powers doctrine, the
legislative branch may not cede its lawmaking function to an
executive branch agency or commission, but may delegate to an
agency or commission the authority to administer the law as
enacted by the legislature. 119 The legislature may confer upon 2n
agency or commission broad authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to further the purposes of specific legislation. 120
However, it is impermissible for an executive agency or
commission to promulgate a rule or regulation which exceeds, or
is inconsistent with, the express or implied purposes of the
relevant statute or statutes. 121 An agency or commission may
only administer the law as enacted and may not make policy
determinations properly reserved to the legislative branch. 122
In Rapp v. Carey,123 the court concluded that while "the ex-
ecutive has the power to enforce legislation and is accorded great
117. 252 N.Y. 27, 168 N.E. 817 (1929).
118. Id. at 39, 168 N.E. at 820.
119. See Levine v. Whalen, 39 N.Y.2d 510, 349 N.E.2d 820, 384
N.Y.S.2d 721, (1976).
Because of the Constitutional provision that '[t]he legislative power of
this State shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly' the Legislature
cannot pass on its law-making functions to other bodies... but there is
no constitutional prohibition against the delegation of power, with
reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission to
administer the law as enacted by the Legislature. (emphasis added).
Id. at 515, 349 N.E.2d at 822, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (quoting N.Y. CONST.
art. IIl, § 1).
120. Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353, 523
N.Y.S.2d 464, 467-68 (1987) (section 225(5)(a) of the Public Health Law,
authorizing the Public Health Commission to "deal with any matters affecting
the . . . public health" is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority).
121. See Tze Chun Liao v. New York State Banking Dep't, 74 N.Y.2d
505, 510, 548 N.E.2d 911, 913, 549 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (1989); see infra
note 146.
122. Tze Chun Liao, 74 N.Y.2d at 510, 548 N.E.2d at 913, 549 N.Y.S.2d
at 375.
123. 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
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flexibility in determining the methods of enforcement...[J]" 124
the executive may not "'go beyond stated legislative policy and
prescribe a remedial device not embraced by the policy." '"125
The court of appeals has most carefully enunciated the factors
which it will consider under the separation of powers doctrine in
Boreali v. Axelrod. 126 There, the court held that a non-smoking
regulation promulgated by the Public Health Commission
pursuant to its general enabling statute, section 225, subdivision
(5)(a) of the Public Health Law, impermissibly transgressed the
"line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-
making."127 The attorney general argued that the legislature had
properly delegated authority to the Public Health Council under
section 225(5)(a) of the Public Health Law to "deal with any
matter for the preservation and improvement of the public
health." ' 128 Principles of administrative law "permit[ted] the
Legislature to confer interstitial policy-maldng authority upon an
administrative agency so long as the Legislature establishes
standards to guide administrative discretion,", 129 and that the
regulation was rationally based. 130
This argument persuaded the lone dissenting judge:
The Legislature declared its intent that there be a PHC in
124. Id. at 163, 375 N.E.2d at 748, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 568; see N.Y.
CONST. art. IV, § 3.
125. Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 163, 375 N.E.2d at 748, 404 N.Y.S.2l at 568
(quoting In re Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976)) (emphasis added).
126. 71 N.Y.2d 1, 11-15, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355-56, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464,
469-71 (1987); see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
127. Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 11, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
128. Brief for Appellant, at 16, Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517
N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief
Boreal].
129. See Appellant's Brief Boreali, supra note 128, at 17 (citing
Chiropractic Ass'n v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 120-21 (1962)).
130. See Appellant's Brief Boreali, supra note 128, at 38 ("So long as the
Legislature has delegated authority to regulate in an identifiable field with
sufficient standards to constrain administrative discretion, and the regulations
reasonably further the statutory objectives, the regulation must be upheld
regardless of their socioeconomic consequences.").
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this State and empowered it to adopt a Sanitary Code for the
preservation and improvement of the public health. The
Legislature also wisely refrained from enacting a rigid formula
for the exercise of the PHC's critical agenda of concerns because
that calls for expert attention. That legislative forbearance
represents both a sound administrative law principle and, at the
threshold, a constitutional one as well (Matter of Levine v.
Whalen, 39 N.Y.2d 510, 515, supra; Chiropractic Assn. v
Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 120, supra). The Legislature could
not have foreseen in 1913 the specific need for PHC regulations
in areas of human blood collection, care and storage; X-ray film
usage; pesticide labels; drinking water contamination; or a
myriad of other public health topics (see, New York State
Sanitary Code, 10 NYCRR parts 1-25). It was prescient and
sound governance as well to grant flexibility to the objective
expert entity so it could in these exceptional instances prescribe
demonstrably needed administrative regulation for the public
health, free from the sometimes paralyzing polemics associated
with the legislative process. Just as many of the other specified
categories in the State Sanitary Code have properly been
regulated by the PHC, so, too, does the subject of public indoor
smoking and its impact on the health and well-being of innocent
third-party victims comfortably fall within that identical, broad
legislative embrace.
While the court admits the difficulty under the high sep-
aration of powers standard of articulating the basis for drawing,
and even finding, some line limiting the PHC's conceded
exercise of authority, it nevertheless goes ahead and does so. Its
line is no line, but rather an arbitrary judgment call of its own. It
is this judicial branch intrusion which constitutes the truly
egregious separation of powers breach into the exercise of
prerogatives of the Legislature (Public Health Law § 225[4],
[5][a] [enabling legislation]) and of the executive (10 NYCRR
25.2 [implementing regulation]).
13 1
But the majority of the court of appeals concluded that "while
Public Health Law § 225(5)(a) is a valid delegation of regulatory
authority, it cannot be construed to encompass the policy-making
131. Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 17-18, 517 N.E.2d at 1358-59, 523 N.Y.S.2d
at 473 (Bellaeosa, J., dissenting).
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activity at issue here without running afoul of the constitutional
separation of powers doctrine." ' 132 The court listed four factors
indicating that the Public Health Commission's no-smoking code
was a usurpation of legislative authority: (1) the regulation
addressed social, economic or political choices, and did not
merely implement the legislature's policy choices; 133 (2) there
were no legislative standards or guidance in the area; 134 (3) the
legislature had tried and failed to make its own policy choices
regarding the issue; 135 (4) the subject of the regulation was not a
technical one which requires greater expertise than that possessed
by the legislature. 136 New York courts have invalidated a number
of other regulations on the basis of one or more of these
criteria. 137 Several recent court of appeals decisions illustrate that
to determine whether or not an agency regulation implements the
legislative policy underlying a statute, one must examine
carefully what has been omitted as well as by what is covered by
the statute in question, as well as other statutes expressive of
legislative policy in the same area. For example, Campagna v.
Shafferl38 involved an order of the secretary of state (Secretary)
prohibiting real estate brokers and salespersons from soliciting
132. Id. at 14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
133. Id. at 11-12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355-56, 523 N.Y.S.2d. at 469-470.
134. Id. at 13, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
135. Id. at 13, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71.
136. Id. at 13-14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
137. E.g., New York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Axelrod, 155 A.D.2d
208, 211-12, 554 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (3d Dep't 1990) (Public Health
Council's regulation subjecting participating Medicaid residential healthcare
facilities to an acceptance and admission quota violates statutory prohibition of
discrimination based on sponsorship); Health Ins. Ass'n of America v.
Corcoran, 154 A.D.2d 61, 72-74, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 612-22 (3d Dep't 1990)
(ban by State Superintendent of Insurance on the use of human
immunodeficiency virus test results in determining insurability of individual
and small group policies); Campagna v. Shaffer, 73 N.Y.2d 237, 536 N.E.2d
368, 538 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1989) (Secretary of State's order prohibiting a
licensed real estate broker from soliciting clients); East Forty Assocs. v.
Ewell, 138 Misc. 2d 235, 246, 527 N.Y.S.2d 204, 210-11 (App. Term 1st
Dep't 1988) (succession provisions of New York City Rent Stabilization
Code).
138. 73 N.Y.2d 237, 536 N.E.2d 368, 538 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1989).
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for sale residential realty in eastern Bronx County and a related
regulation restricting the number of brokers permitted to operate
in the areas covered by the non-solicitation order. The Secretary
relied on her authority to license real estate brokers and
salespersons, 139  to discipline licensees who demonstrate
"untrustworthiness, '"140 and to enact rules and regulations to
effectuate this authority, 141 "which, reasonably interpreted,
authorizes her to set standards of conduct for the real estate
industry and to promulgate regulations pertaining to the licensing
and disciplining of real estate brokers." 142 In the State Human
Rights Law, 14 3 by separate enactment, the legislature had made
illegal any broker's representation that changes to the racial or
ethnic character of a neighborhood might lead to undesirable
consequences of any kind. 144
Nevertheless, the court held that the Secretary's nonsolicitation
order exceeded her authority because it exceeded the clear leg-
islative policy to interdict only illegal solicitation, not all broker
solicitation. 145 The court stressed, "[ain agency cannot by its
regulations effect its vision of societal policy choices . . . and
may adopt only rules and regulations which are in harmony with
the statutory responsibilities it has been given to administer." 146
139. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1991).
140. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-c (McKinney 1989).
141. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 91 (McKinney 1982).
142. Campagna, 73 N.Y.2d at 240, 536 N.E.2d at 369, 538 N.Y.S.2d at
934.
143. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
144. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3-b) (McKinney 1982).
145. Campagna, 73 N.Y.2d at 243, 536, N.E.2d at 370, 538 N.Y.S.2d at
935.
146. Id.; see also Kahal Bnei Emunim v. Town of Fallsburg, N.Y.L.J.,
July 3, 1991, at 22, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991); Tze Chun Liao v. New
York State Banking Dep't, 74 N.Y.2d 505, 548 N.E.2d 911, 549 N.Y.S.2d
373, (1989). In Tze Chun Liao, the court of appeals held that the State Banking
Department exceeded its regulatory authority by denying a check cashier
license based upon criteria not contained in the State Banking Law, declaring
"[a]n agency cannot create rules, through its own interstitial declaration, that
were not contemplated or authorized by the Legislature and thus, in effect,
empower themselves to rewrite or add substantially to the administrative
charter itself." Id. at 510, 548 N.E.2d at 913, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 375. See also
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The Executive Law147 gives the State Ethics Commission the
authority to regulate the "outside activities" of persons subject to
its jurisdiction. To be consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine, 148 a rule promulgated by the State Ethics Commission
McNulty v. State Tax Comm'n, 70 N.Y.2d 788, 791, 516 N.E.2d 1217,
1218, 522 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (1987) ("Administrative agencies can only
promulgate rules to further the implementation of the law as it exists; they
have no authority to create a rule out of harmony with the statute.") (quoting
Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 53, 332 N.E.2d 303, 308, 371 N.Y.S.2d
422, 429 (1975)).
If the legislature had enacted the substance of Rule 932.2 and purported to
make it self-executing, interesting issues would still be raised. For example, in
Strati v. Balancia, an amendment to the Town of Harrison Ethics Code,
providing that running for office on the Town Board or as supervisor
constitutes cause for removal from any of several town boards dealing with
real property planning, zoning or assessment, was upheld against challenges
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1991, at 28, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991).
The court also held that the amendment was not unconstitutional by reason of
the fact that "at the time [plaintiff] accepted his appointment on the Planning
Board, he was not required to waive his right to run for office." Id. Although
not clearly expressed, the court appears to conclude that the new conflict of
interests provision neither removed plaintiff from his first appointive position
nor proscribed him from running for elective office, but reasonably required
him to make a choice between the two offices. But see L. TRIBE, AMRCAN
CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW § 4-9, at 190 (1st ed. 1978) "While Congress may
delegate some of its removal power to the Executive, it cannot usurp that
removal power which the Constitution vests in the Executive. In particular,
congressional authority to force the President, or other executive authorities,
to dismiss particular government officials is severely limited." Id. (citing
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-18 (1946) (decided on bill of
attainder grounds rather than power of removal grounds also argued to the
court)).
Finally, the Strati court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the conflict of
interests amendment, enacted after the plaintiff had accepted the appointive
office, amounted to a bill of attainder under the federal Constitution. Cf.
United States v. Lovett, where a rider to a federal appropriations statute
prohibiting use of any appropriated monies after a specified date to make
salary payments to three named employees of the United States Post Office was
held to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 328 U.S. 303, 315-18 (1946).
147. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94(16)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
148. The standards that have evolved through New York Court of Appeals
cases for determining whether a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
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must adhere to the specific terms and general purposes of Public
Officers Law sections 73, 73-a, and 74.
As we have seen, section 73(1)(i)(iv) exempts uncompensated
and per diem members or directors of a public benefit
corporation from the statute's conflict of interest provisions as
they relate to "state officers or employees." ' 149 Because of this
exemption, the outside activities of an uncompensated or per
diem member or director is beyond the jurisdiction of the outside
activities to be restricted by an administrative exercise of the
section 94(16)(a) power. However, rule 932.2 would subject such
member or director to the political party office prohibition. There
is no evidence that such a rule is consistent with the intent of the
legislature. Indeed, the 1989 amendments of section 73 by New
York Laws Chapter 242,150 which clarify and expand the class of
has occurred were succinctly summarized by the Appellate Division in Citizens
for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. Cuomo, where the court held the
acquisition and closing of Shoreham nuclear power facility by the Long Island
Power Authority was authorized by the legislature even in the absence of a
complete takeover of Long Island Lighting Company by the power authority.
159 A.D.2d 141, 559 N.Y.S.2d 381 (3d Dep't 1990), aff'd, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
24, 1991, at 22, col. 3 (Ct. App. 1991).
The court restated the basic standard "that the executive branch may not
infringe upon the primacy of the legislative branch in the policy-making
function of government," noted that such infringement is more likely to occur
when an executive agency purports to act pursuant to a "claimed implied
general authority to enforce the law," rather than under an express statutory
delegation of power by the legislature, and acknowledged that broad
delegations of implementing authority permitting "considerable flexibility and
discretion to determine the means of enforcement," are valid "where the
subject matter is complex and the future circumstances to be encountered in
carrying out the legislative will are not readily foreseeable." Id. at 152-53,
559 N.Y.S.2d at 387. However, the court also emphasized that the executive
branch must, in any case, refrain from (a) utilizing a remedial device not
embraced by the legislature's policy objective, (b) "engaging in broad policy
making on controversial issues not foreseen or contemplated when the enabling
legislation was enacted," or (c) taking any action that is not "consistent with
legislative policy choices," or does not bear "a reasonable relation to the
purpose of the enabling legislation." Id.
149. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(1)(i)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1991); see
supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
150. Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 242, 1989 N.Y. Laws 609 (McKinney).
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part-time uncompensated public officers not subject to section 73,
are powerful evidence that rule 932.2 is inconsistent with the
legislature's intent. 151 Furthermore, as explained above, section
73(9) prohibits only judges and certain state law officers from
simultaneously holding political party office, but rule 932.2
extends this prohibition to almost all public officers. There is no
evidence that such a rule is consistent with the intent of the
legislature and, as we have seen, much evidence that it is not. 152
Section 73-a(l)(c)(iii) includes an uncompensated or per diem
member or director of a public benefit corporation as a "state
officer or employee" subject to section 73-a's financial disclosure
requirements, presumably because such persons are always
policy-makers within the ambit of the disclosure provisions.
Section 94(16)(a) clearly gives the Commission authority to
regulate such members' and directors' outside activities as they
pertain to the financial disclosure requirements. However, rule
932.2 would restrict all such members and directors as well as all
other policy-makers within the meaning of section 73-1(1)(c)(iil)
from holding political office, a notion nowhere to be found in
section 73-a. Indeed, the legislature specifically considered the
issue of dual office holding in the context of persons subject to
section 73-a and merely required disclosure of any political party
office held by the filer in the statutorily mandated disclosure
form. 15
3
Looking at rule 932.2 in light of the four Boreali factors 154 is
instructive. First, the regulation does make a social and political
judgment that all part-time uncompensated members and directors
of public benefit corpoiations and public authorities, as well as
all other State officers and employees who serve in policy-making
positions, would face untenable conflicts of interest if they were
to simultaneously hold office in a political party or political
organization, or serve as a district leader of a political party or as
a member of any political party committee, including the national
151. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
153. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(3), Item 7 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
154. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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committee of a political party. 155 This is precisely the kind of
judgment made by the legislature in enacting and amending
subdivision 9 of Public Officers Law section 73. Secondly, there
are legislative standards in this area, namely Public Officers Law
section 73(9), section 73(l)(i) and Item 7 under section
73-a(3). 156 The Ethics Commission appears to have ignored these
standards, and we know of no other provision of State law
directly addressing and supporting the policy choices made by the
Commission in rule 932.2. Thirdly, the legislature had not only
tried but succeeded in making its own policy choices in this
area, 157 and the legislature's policy choices are not consistent
with those made by the Commission, as expressed in rule 932.2.
Finally, the subject of the regulations was substantive, not
technical, as shown by the fact that the legislature had made
precisely the same kind of judgment or determination in
Executive Law section 94(2) and Education Law section
2590-c(4), as well as Public Officers Law section 73(9).158
Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how a court could
fail to find that rule 932.2 is not only "out of harmony"' 159 with
the statute it purports to implement, but also an invasion of the
legislature's policy-making function and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, under existing law there appears to be no autho-
rized penalty for violations of rule 932.2 and no authority for im-
plementing rule 932.7. Penalties otherwise provided under other
statutes may be available, for example, removal under the Public
155. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 19, § 932.2 (1990).
156. See supra notes 51-109 and accompanying text.
157. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(9) (McKinney 1988).
158. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
159. Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 53, 332 N.E.2d 303, 308, 371
N.Y.S.2d 422, 429 (1975) (Social services regulation unconditionally
provided that emergency funds to replace stolen or misspent grants received
under the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program was void
where the regulation added a requirement not present in the statute.).
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Officers Law or suspension under the Civil Service Law.
Substantively, it appears doubtful that the legislature intended
to authorize the Commission to deny to prospective and sitting
public officers the opportunity or right to continue in or assume
certain political party offices, unless such public officers are
already covered by the proscription of subdivision 9 of Public
Officers Law section 73. Even greater doubts are raised with
respect to part-time uncompensated public officers because of the
legislature's careful exclusion of such public officers from almost
all other substantive proscriptions of the Ethics in Government
Act. Finally, even if rule 932.2 is within the validly delegated
authority of the Commission, it encompasses policy-making
activity reserved to the legislature under the state constitution's
separation of powers doctrine.
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